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Abstract 
 
This paper provides an analysis of earnings management by the shareholders in a mergers and 
acquisitions setting, recognising that such opportunistic behaviour can have irreversible 
wealth consequences for both target and acquirer shareholders. The purpose of this study is to 
examine the role of earning management and the associated importance from the perspective 
of shareholders. In other words, we set up a brief discussion of the acquirers firms’ 
motivations for practicing earnings management. Earnings management is not only induced 
for motivation related to mergers and acquisitions context, but also by those linked to 
shareholders’ perception. Empirical results show that on the whole, two (independent boards 
and audit size) of the four variables are related to shareholders ‘perception factors. In 
addition, two (nature of the operation, use of accounting criteria) of the four variables linked 
to mergers and acquisitions operations are found to significantly determine earnings 
management by the acquirings firms.  
Keywords: shareholders’ perception, mergers & acquisitions operations, earnings 
management, acquiring firms 
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1. Introduction 
Accounting is used as a tools for firms to communicate important internal information to 
external stakeholders, who rely on such information to evaluate the performance of the firms 
and to make informed decisions. The discretion to how accounting information can be 
reported are given to managers in a way to best and most efficiently reflect firms’ 
performance and value within the requirements of the accounting standards. And whilst these 
discretions may not always be used in the way to accurately present firm values, they can be 
used for opportunistic reasons, raising the issue of earnings management (Wang, 2014). 
As a major strategic decision, the market’s attitude to mergers & acquisitions can directly 
affect the prospects for future development of the enterprise; it also encourages the motivation 
of company management to falsify earnings reports, making some profit in the merger process 
of earnings management behavior (Shuang &Rong. 2014). 
Some studies on mergers & acquisitions have revealed that the target shareholders benefit the 
most while the acquirer shareholders are usually losers following an acquisition. Thus, the 
acquirer may intentionally engage in earnings management or its management may merely be 
optimistic about the future of the combined firm and engages in income increasing accruals 
based on this optimism.                                                                                                               
Banseh & Khansalar (2016) have reached a possible explanations for the acquirer’s 
management to inflate the value of the firm preceding the acquisition announcement. In this 
case, the acquirer could be creating income enhancing accruals to drive up the value of the 
firm’s stock and end up acquiring the target at a favorable rate of exchange. 
In this paper, we will try to examine, on the one hand, whether acquirers use earnings 
management to boost their stock prices prior to announcing an acquisition where stock is used 
as a method of payment. On the other hand, we tend to analyse factors that could potentially 
mitigate or exacerbate acquirer managers’ opportunistic behavior. These factors include the 
impact of such manipulations on the shareholders ‘perception.  
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2. Hypothesis development 
2.1.  Detection of accounting and financial manipulations 
The merger operation results in a change in power relations in the acquiring company. This 
change is manifested by a dilution of capital and shareholder and managerial power after the 
merger which is the result of exchange of shares between the participating companies. Thus 
the leaders of the acquiring company may seek to preserve their interests and those of their 
shareholders in order to prevent such dilution. They can therefore attempt to influence the 
exchange parity by implementing, in the year preceding the operation, an accounting policy 
affecting the value of their firm. 
A review of the literature on the existence of earnings management before the operation 
merger and acquisition allowed us to clear the hypothesis that the managers of the 
participating companies adopt earnings management before the operation. 
Consistent with previous studies, we document that managers of acquiring companies engage 
in more aggressive earnings management in cases of stock-financed acquisitions. Moreover, 
in cash-financed acquisitions there is no evidence at all of earnings management prior to the 
announcement of the deal. 
Among these studies, the work of Alsharairi (2012) can be highlighted. According to him, to 
predict pre-merger earnings management by non-cash acquirers, we can use two theories, 
namely window-dressing and the double lemons’ problem.                                          
The term ‘window-dressing’, from an accounting perspective, refers to a broad range of 
techniques undertaken by a firm aimed at enhancing the financial position of the firm as 
perceived by users. This occurs through adjusting reports, financial ratios and disclosures to 
look better (Hillier et al. 2008). In a narrower view, window-dressing can also be directly 
associated with financial reporting practices that impact the earnings figure (Feltham and Xie 
1994), since one of the incentives for window-dressing “relates to perceptions of earnings 
figures as a key cognitive reference point in the eyes of financial statement users (Guan et al. 
2008, p.26)”. 
According to this view, it could be argued that a non-cash acquirer has a motivation to 
brighten up its reports by managing earnings upward before approaching a target firm, in 
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order to seem more attractive and convincing to the target’s shareholders to receive 
acceptance and successful completion of a mergers & acquisitions deal. 
From a different theoretical perspective, as noted earlier, the participants in the mergers & 
acquisitions market have imperfect information regarding each other’s firm. Each party 
expects the other to make rational decisions that maximise their own Mergers &Acquisitions 
gains. There is an uncertainty in the acquirer’s information regarding the target’s real value. 
The lemons’ problem causes the acquirer to discount the target’s value avoiding potential 
adverse selection. A parallel scenario may occur on the target’s side if it was offered equity 
issue in the payment structure. Hansen (1987) describes this situation as a double lemons’ 
problem, suggesting that a target would suffer a similar information uncertainty regarding the 
acquirer’s true value. 
In this respect, Erickson and Wang (1999) note that pre-merger earnings management implies 
two incentives to the acquiring firm. The first is that the acquirer has an incentive to obtain 
capital at a lower cost so that the acquirer’s management attempt to reduce the number of 
shares issued to the target and retain stronger control. The second incentive is to try to 
mitigate the post-merger diluting effect on the acquirer shareholders’ rights of voting and 
profit sharing (i.e. their EPS) by minimising the number of shares that the acquirer is going to 
issue to the target’s shareholders in the merger exchange. 
Guo et al. (2008) have added that acquirers do not only have the motivation to manage 
earnings, but they also have control over the timing element in initiating the M&A process 
which enhances their efficiency in undertaking pre-merger earnings management. 
Hence, the first hypothesis in this study is formulated as follows: 
H1. Acquiring firms manage their earnings prior to the announcement date of a Mergers & 
Acquisitions deal if they offer equity shares in the deal. 
2.2.  Factors related to shareholder’s perception and those linked to mergers and 
acquisitions context.  
2.2.1. Impact of shareholder’s perception  
2.2.1.1.  Share of a manager in the capital 
By referring to the positive accounting theory, managers whose remuneration is indexed on 
the performance generated by the company, are looking to increase their remuneration. 
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The agency theory suggests executive compensation as the appropriate antidote to align the 
interests of managers and shareholders. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), executive compensation may encourage managers 
to undertake certain transactions that aim to maximise their benefits rather than shareholders. 
In the context of mergers and absorptions operations, there is evidence that managers 
manipulate reported earnings upward employing earnings management activities to meet 
performance-based compensation targets (Bergstresser &Philippon, 2006; Cazier, 2009). 
Missonier-Piera and Ben-Amar 2007 stipulate that managers can attempt through the 
operation across their accounting policy to maximize their interests at the expense of their 
shareholders. Thus, these managers, when holders of company shares, have as shareholders an 
interest to negotiate a parity required to grant a limited number of shares to shareholders of 
the absorbed (the acquired). 
In this regard, we expect that anxious to preserve their remuneration and their power, 
managers should therefore adopt more accounting choices increasing their earnings as the 
proportion of voting rights held by them in the absorbent is important. 
Hence, the following hypothesis can be advanced: 
H2. The more managers hold a significant participation in the acquiring firm, the higher the 
level of earning management and this is a year prior to the announcement date of a mergers & 
acquisitions deal. 
2.2.1.2.  Shareholder structure 
In the context of mergers and takeovers, the ownership structure of the acquiring company 
will be changed. Thus, when the pre- existing shareholders in the acquiring company hold a 
significant share of capital and voting rights, they are especially exposed to the effects of the 
decisions of managers, therefore the dilutive impact of the transaction (Smith, 1976). When 
ownership is concentrated, the change introduced by the merger can lead in this case to reduce 
this concentration. Dominant shareholders are going to seek on the occasion of the conclusion 
of forward transaction to preserve their interests. In their negotiations, they will take into 
account the current costs and future advantages of the operation and will be willing to pay a 
higher price (ie to agree on a less favorable parity) only if future benefits outweigh the cost. 
But as the cost components are the dilutive effects outlined above, the grant of such parity 
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will be against the interests of the dominant shareholders of the absorbent because it modifies 
immediately and at a time their power and wealth. 
Fakhfakh & Nasfi (2012) show that control of the acquiring company by a shareholder 
(manager, ruling family, institutional investor) could be used to obtain private benefits by 
pursuing higher growth targets on the size of the firm rather than maximizing shareholder 
wealth. As a result, negative performance may increase when the family holds the position of 
the leader. Whereas if the family control is associated with an officer external to the family, it 
has an incentive to minimize agency costs and exercise greater control on managers to 
maximize firm value. 
These developments lead us to put forward the following hypothesis: 
H3: If the ownership structure is concentrated, acquiring firms manage their earnings the year 
prior to the announcement date of a mergers & acquisitions deal. 
2.2.1.3.  Board of directors 
According to agency theory, the purpose of the board of directors is to minimize agency costs.  
In fact, the effectiveness of the control board is supposed to be based on the presence of 
outside directors. 
The cognitive approach to governance considers the system of governance as a key player in 
trade and construction of knowledge. This should facilitate coordination and reduce the costs 
of separate cognitive conflicts of interest, such as studying the traditional approach to 
shareholder (Fakhfakh & Nasfi 2012).                                                                                                        
In this context, Charreaux (2003), Osterloh and Frey (2004), consider that the cognitive 
approach of the Board is supported by the cognitive contribution of the individual members as 
well evidenced by the knowledge and skills of inside directors as those of outside directors in 
prediction and interpretation of results. The characteristics of the board may define the powers 
and influence the decisions of leaders. Among the characteristics of the board we can find: the 
size, composition and independence. 
Literature in the Anglo-Saxon context states that the first Board mission is to guarantee the 
interests of shareholders. In this case, directors should stand by the managers practices. But in 
the French context, according to Jeanjean (2002), the first vocation of directors is to ensure 
the social interest which by definition is not confused with shareholders’ interests. 
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The nature of earnings management should not influence the quality control of independent 
directors. Consequently, the proportion of independent directors to the board (or supervisory 
board) should limit the possibilities of action leaders. This results in the following hypothesis: 
H 4:  The higher the proportion of independent directors is important, the lower the level of 
earning management of acquiring companies is high and this is a year prior to the 
announcement date of a mergers & acquisitions deal. 
2.2.1.4. external auditor 
The employment of an independent external auditor to verify accounting numbers reported by 
managers is a market-induced mechanism to reduce agency costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1983). 
Chung et al. (2005) examine the effectiveness of high-quality auditors as an external 
monitoring mechanism for a sample of low-growth firms with high free cash flow, who have 
the incentive to report income-increasing accruals in order to offset the low or negative 
earnings that inevitably accompany investments with negative net present values. They, too, 
find that Big 6 auditors are effective in deterring managers’ opportunistic earnings 
management. 
In the context of mergers and acquisitions, we are dealing with a second control that is to 
audit the financial statements used to set the exchange ratio. (Legal obligation) (Fakhfakh & 
Nasfi 2012).                                                                                                        . 
Abbot and al (2004), Bradbury and al (2006) and Mc Meeking and al (2007), have assumed 
through their theoretical and empirical studies that the "Big N" differ from other audit firms 
for their cautious approach toward the accounting choices. Consequently, the discretionary 
accruals of companies audited by "Big N "are significantly lower than the discretionary 
accruals of other companies. 
Like Sundgren (2003) in the context of public offerings as part of the French mergers, it is 
postulated that there is a negative link between membership of the auditors in a big audit firm 
and the level of earnings management ahead absorbent companies. 
From the foregoing, we express in our turn the following hypothesis: 
H5: In the presence of at least one auditor belonging to a big audit firm, the level of earning 
management of acquiring companies decreases and this is a year prior to the announcement 
date of a mergers & acquisitions deal. 
2.3. Impact of mergers and acquisitions context  
2.3.1. Size of the operation  
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Erickson and Wang (1999) are the first to show earnings management for the case of the 
acquiring firm for operations financed by share exchanges. For these authors, the exchange 
parity is an inverse function of the share value of the acquiring company. The manager would 
be encouraged to increase their accounting results during the period preceding the operation to 
improve the value of securities of their company, notably the share price. 
Their objective would be to minimize the number of shares to be issued and incidentally the 
cost of the operation. 
In the context of merger, the absorbent, whether initiator or target, is only to issue shares. 
Thus accounting behaviors of leaders should lead to a reduction in the number of shares 
issued. The motivations of leaders to adopt accounting and financial choices increase the 
value of their business and therefore lead to a reduction in the cost of the operation for the 
shareholders of the acquiring company. 
Several studies suggest that if the target firm size is relatively small compared to the one of 
the acquiring firm, the relative size from increasing stock price via manipulated earnings will 
also be relatively small (Fakhfakh & Nasfi 2012).                                                                                                         
We can pose our hypothesis: 
H6: The more important the size of the operation, the higher the level of earning management 
of acquiring companies and this is a year prior to the announcement date of a mergers & 
acquisitions deal. 
2.3.2. Dilution effects 
The issuance of securities of the acquiring companies to pay for shareholders' contribution of 
the acquired companies may lead to a dilution of capital and voting rights of the pre- existing 
shareholders in the acquiring companies. 
It is worth noting in this context that the existence of dilutive effects on earnings and control 
therefore encourage the leaders of the acquiring companies to adopt accounting and financial 
choices improving their results (Erickson &Wang, 1999; Asano & al. 2007 ; Francoeur         
& Rakoto, 2007). Indeed, if the exchange ratio and the dilutive effects are inversely related to 
the value of shares of the acquiring companies, leaders can through the higher earnings 
management try to minimize the number of shares to be issued and therefore the dilutive 
effects of the operation (Boutant & Djama, 2006). 
The level of dilution being, all things being equal, an inverse function of the value of 
acquiring companies,  the more dilutive effects are expected before the operation, the more 
shareholders of acquiring companies have an interest in what their leaders adopt accounting 
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and financial choices which will improve the value of their company and reduce the number 
of shares to be issued. 
We can advance this hypothesis: 
H7: The more important the expected dilutive effects, the higher the level of earning 
management of acquiring companies. 
 
2.3.3. nature of the operation 
According to Asano and al. (2007), the objective of the grouping influences the earnings 
management of the acquiring companies. They indicated that they manage their results 
differently depending on the nature of the operation. Indeed, the reasons why the leaders 
manage their results to the increase may vary depending on the nature of the operation; that is 
to say when the operation corresponds to a takeover or restructuring of the group. 
If in the context of takeovers parity is at the heart of the concerns of actors so as not only the 
cost but also the control are at stake. During restructuring, the control is established and 
actions taken to act on parity are not intended to challenge the control, but they should be 
designed to minimize the cost of operation by offering a reduced number of shares to minority 
shareholders of the target. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1990) considered that leaders manage their results when they 
anticipate higher profits in this management costs of not managing. However, in the context 
of takeovers, the costs resulting from the earnings management can put a considerable strain 
on the expected benefits. In fact, the management teams are strongly encouraged to call on 
experts (accountants, auditors, investment banks, etc.) to assess the financial statements of the 
opposing companies. The leaders of the participating companies in takeovers can estimate the 
probability that the manipulation detected is high because of mutual supervision.                    
However, the other company can request a review of the parity or even threaten to cancel. 
This makes it possible to prevent the participating companies from adopting a earnings 
management which increase the value of their company. 
On the contrary, as regards restructuring, earnings management is easier to the extent that the 
parent company controls the accounts of his daughter. It can exert "intra-group earnings 
management" and locate the benefits so as to justify an understated price for the minority of 
the target (Thauvron, 2000). 
Accordingly, the leaders of acquiring companies should adopt more accountants and financial 
decisions improving their results during restructuring as during takeovers. 
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Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H8: During restructuring, acquiring companies displayed a level upward of earnings 
management higher than the acquiring companies in takeovers. 
2.3.4. Multi-criteria approach 
Since 1977, the SEC (then AMF) recommends using a multi-criteria approach to select, 
calculate and weigh several evaluation criteria (stock prices, the results, the net and reassessed 
assets, discounted cash flows, etc.) to determine the relative values of the participating 
companies as a reference to the fixing of parity. Indeed, the different criteria used can be 
based directly on the accounting and financial statements submitted by the leaders. This is 
particularly the case when the evaluation criteria refer to revenues, the gross operating 
surplus, accounting results, the cash flow, the accountant net and reassessed assets, etc. The 
criteria may also be based indirectly on accounting and financial statements. This is notably 
the case when the evaluation criteria are the stock prices, the multiple, the discounted future 
cash flows, etc. In the French context, the leaders of acquiring companies may therefore 
attempt to influence the parity not only in their choice of selection and combination of parity 
criteria but also by financial and accounting manipulations (Boutant, 2009). 
In this perspective, it can be assumed that the relationship between the exchange parity and 
earnings management is stronger when accounting criteria are directly mobilized. Indeed 
according to the efficient market hypothesis, the courses which normally represent the best 
estimate of the intrinsic value of the company should not be affected by earnings 
management. 
These developments lead us to put forward the following hypothesis: 
H9: the acquiring companies where the value of shares is estimated based on accounting 
criteria displayed level upward of earnings management higher than other acquiring 
companies. 
3.  Research methodology 
This section is devoted to discussing the empirical methodology applied to test the already-
developed hypotheses. 
3.1.  Variable measurement  
3.1.1. Measuring the dependent variable: Detection of accounting and financial 
manipulations 
In consistency with several previously-elaborated studies, discretionary accruals have been 
selected, in this research, as a means to measure the earnings management (e.g., Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010; Gong and al., 2008; Hadani, Goranova & Khan, 2011; Higgins, 2013). 
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Indeed, Healy (1985) and De Angelo (1986) were the first authors to develop models to 
estimate the discretionary accruals based on the assumption of stationarity non-discretionary 
accruals.  That is, they have assumed that non-discretionary accruals are constant. 
Subsequently, Jones (1991) defines a model, widely reported in the work of the results 
management, which includes the impact of economic factors on the calculation of normal 
accruals (Benkraiem 2008). According to this model, non-discretionary accruals are function 
of turnover variable, assumed to follow the evolution of economic conditions, and the 
company's investment policies (the level of property, plant and equipment.). Thus, the total 
accruals (TA) are defined as follows: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
 𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛼0
1
  𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛼1
Δ𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
  𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛼2
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
With, TAit represents the total accruals for fiscal year t and firm i, 
Ait-1:  total assets for fiscal year t and firm i, 
ΔREVit : the change in revenues for fiscal year t and firm i, 
PPEit: the gross value of property, plant and equipment for fiscal year t and firm i, 
α0, α1, α2: regression parameters 
εit: error term 
Jones model is based on the implicit assumption that the change in revenues (REV) is not 
discretionary (Dechow et al. 1995). But some REV elements such as customer payment terms 
can be influenced by management. To reduce this bias, Dechow et al. (1995) proposed a 
modified version of Jones model. 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛼0
1
  𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛼1
Δ𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛼2
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
  𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Another modification of the original Jones model is the integration of a third explanatory 
variable in the model: cash flow generated by the activity (Dechow et al 1995). The model is 
therefore written: 
𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡
 𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
=
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
− [?̅?0
1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ ?̅?1
Δ𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ ?̅?2
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ ?̅?3
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡] 
3.1.2. Measuring the explanatory variables 
In accordance with the theoretical part of this research, we will split the presentation of 
measurement explanatory variables in two parts. Specific measures reveal the impact of 
shareholders’ perception and mergers-acquisitions context. 
3.1.2.1. Stakeholders’ perception 
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 Executive Compensation 
According to Young's research (1998), Erickson and Wang (1999) the variable remuneration 
is measured by the percentage holding in managers voting rights. 
 Shareholder structure 
If the ownership structure is measured according to Saada (1995) and Jeanjean (2002) by the 
ownership percentage of major shareholders (at least 5% of shares), Djama (2002) retains the 
thresholds of 1/3 and 50% of the voting rights as a proxy for this variable. 
Thus, the proxies used to measure this variable differs from a research study to another. 
Considering that ownership is concentrated as soon as at least one shareholder can block 
important decisions taken by the company (such as the approval of the merger extraordinary 
general meeting), the concentration of the shareholders is a dummy variable 1 if at least one 
shareholder owns more than a third of voting rights in extraordinary general meeting and 0 
otherwise. 
 Board independence 
Independent directors include those who have no material relationship with the listed 
company directly, or as a partner, shareholder, or officer of an organization that has a 
relationship with the company (Fakhfakh & Nasfi, 2012). 
According Petroni and Beasley (2001) the independence of boards is measured by the 
following ratio: 
% independent boards =
number of independent directors
total number of directors on the board 
 
 
 Auditor size 
To measure this variable, Jeanjean (2002) postulates that when at least one auditor belongs to 
a big audit firm, leaders do not adopt the accounting and financial choices. So a dichotomous 
variable is used; it takes the value 1 when at least one auditor of the acquiring company 
belongs to a big audit firm and 0 otherwise. 
3.1.2.2.  mergers-acquisitions context 
 Operation size 
In this study we made use of the research of Erickson and Wang (1999) to measure the 
relative size of the operation. In fact, these authors were the first to provide a measure to this 
variable. They considered that the relative size of the operation is used as an indicator of the 
expected benefits of earnings management. 
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Those researchers used a dichotomous variable equal to 1 when this ratio exceeds the average 
of the sample ratios and 0 otherwise. This implies that when the relative size of the operation 
is high (above average), the level of earnings management of acquiring companies is higher 
than when the relative size of the operation is low (less than average). 
However, the partition between low and high relative size is not based on the average but the 
median, this one is not influenced by extreme values. The variable operation size therefore 
takes the value 1 when the ratio of the operation exceeds the median and 0 in the opposite 
case. 
 Dilution effects 
No research to our knowledge has proceeded to test this variable except the Djama and 
Boutant (2006). Indeed, it is likely to explain this lack of testing by the researchers by the 
difficulty in determining the precise level of expected dilution before the operation. Inspired 
by the work of these authors, we measure the expected dilutive effects by the variation 
percentage of voting rights of major shareholders before and after the operation. 
 Nature of the operation 
French accounting regulations of mergers and acquisitions specifies that the determination of 
the nature of the merger operation based on the situation of control between the companies 
before this operation. 
In this study and in order to provide a measure of the nature of the operation variable we use 
CRC regulation 99-02 as amended by CRC Regulation 2004-03. Indeed, a dichotomous 
variable was created using the concept of exclusive control defined by these regulations. This 
variable is equal to 1 when no control link higher than 40% of the voting rights are observed 
between the participating companies or with the same parent company (the transaction is a 
takeover), and 0 otherwise. That is to say, when a link in voting rights between the 
participating companies or with the same parent company exists and exceeds the 40% 
threshold, the operation is considered restructuring. 
 Multi-criteria approach 
In the French context of mergers and takeovers, the financial regulator recommends the 
implementation of a multi-criteria approach of using several assessment criteria for 
determining the exchange parity. 
To provide a measure for the variable "accounting standards" we made use of Boutant’s work 
(2010). In fact, the researcher used a dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 when at least 
one accounting criterion is used (revenue, gross operating surplus, accounting results, cash 
flow, etc.) and 0 otherwise. 
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3.1.2.3. Control variable  
 Leverage 
In the merger context, the creditors, who bear the risk of the absorbent bankruptcy, will be 
particularly attentive to the evolution of the debt level after the operation. Also, given the 
balance of forces exerted between the participating companies, leaders have every incentive to 
put forward low debt which allows to get a more favorable parity. 
To measure this variable, we use the work of Piot and Janin (2007). In this perspective, the 
variable debt is measured by the debt / equity ratio. 
 size of the acquiring company 
Labo and Zhou (2006) argue that large firms have incentives to increase the value of their 
earnings because their business activities are complex. This result was shown by the 
following research (e. g Jo and Kim , 2007). 
In accordance with the work of Djama (2002), Piot and Janin (2007), Hamza and Lakhal 
(2010), the variable size of the absorbent is measured by the logarithm of total assets of the 
acquiring company. 
3.2. Research design 
Econometric validity of our assumptions above requires the choice of an appropriate 
methodology which is capable of highlighting the effect of explanatory variables on earnings 
management. So, we proceed to the regression of the amount of discretionary accruals 
estimated for each business year preceding the operation (t-1) on the set of explanatory 
variables. The model used is: 
𝐃𝐀𝐢 = 𝛃𝟎 + 𝛃𝟏𝐄𝐱𝐞𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐞𝐧𝐢 + 𝛃𝟐𝐒𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐞𝐒𝐭𝐫𝐮𝐢 + 𝛃𝟑𝐁𝐨𝐚𝐫𝐝𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐩𝐢 + 𝛃𝟒𝐀𝐮𝐝𝐒𝐢 + 𝛃𝟓𝐎𝐩𝐞𝐒𝐢
+ 𝛃𝟔𝐃𝐢𝐥𝐮𝐢 + 𝛃𝟕𝐎𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐍𝐚𝐭𝐮𝐢 + 𝛃𝟖𝐌𝐮𝐥𝐭𝐢𝐢 + 𝛃𝟗𝐋𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐢 + 𝛃𝟏𝟎𝐒𝐢𝐳𝐞𝐢 + 𝛆𝐢 
With β0: constant. 
3.3. Sample 
Our empirical study includes initially 50 listed acquiring companies on the stock exchange of 
Paris which have participate in the merger between 2008 and 2014. Mergers for which the 
absorbent has a purely financial activity or insurance are excluded due to motivations and 
accounting regulations specific to these companies. This step led us to eliminate 10 
operations. The final sample is composed of 40 operations that correspond to acquiring 
companies. 
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It should be noted that the data collected for the study of the determinants of earnings 
management during mergers are extracted  whether from treated mergers, annual reports of 
the acquiring companies from the website of the Financial Market Authority and institutional 
websites of the participating companies in the operation. 
4. Main empirical results 
4.1. Hypothesis assessment of the existence of earnings management ahead mergers 
and acquisitions 
The table below (table 1) shows the depiction of the total accruals’ descriptive statistics and 
their components relevant to the periods T-1, T-2, T-3 and T-4. 
 TA Δ NWC A P Rev IP 
T-1 
Mean 0.023 0.039 0.015 0.026 0.018 0.0016 
Std. dev 0.09 0.1 0.025 0.037 0.029 0.007 
T-2 
Mean 0.019 -0.006 0.014 0.026 0.024 0.007 
Std. dev 0.054 0.051 0.024 0.027 0.039 0.009 
T-3 
Mean -0.065 -0.026 0.02 0.052 0.0255 0.0032 
Std. dev 0.108 0.069 0.048 0.08 0.057 0.0041 
T-4 
Mean -0.04 -0.0026 0.034 0.048 0.0358 0.0043 
Std. dev 0.112 0.098 0.091 0.077 0.08 0.0059 
TA: Total accruals, Δ NWC: Need for working capital, A: Amortization, P: Provision, Reve: Reversals of 
depreciation and provisions, IP: Immobilised Production.. 
We can deduce from a reading of Table 1 in t-1, total accruals are positive and have averaged 
2.3% of total assets in the previous year. Conversely, between t-2 and t-4 before the operation, 
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all total accruals are on average negative and represent -0.019% respectively - 0.065% and 
0.04% of total assets. It thus seems that this result supports the idea according to which the 
leaders could adopt accounting and financial choices just before the operation (t-1). 
Concerning the total Accruals component elements, we note that the change in t-1 in working 
capital averaged 3.9% of total assets. However, in t-2, t-3 and t-4, it was negative between   -
0.0026 and -0.026. This increase in working capital in t-1 compared to the years preceding it 
can be an enabling factor in the adoption of an accounting policy from leaders to improve the 
result. 
This first descriptive analysis of total accruals as well as their elements make up the 
possibility of adoption of accounting and financial leadership selection to improve their 
results. 
It is through an estimate of discretionary accruals that we can test the hypothesis concerning 
the existence of earnings management of acquiring companies. We will first proceed to 
estimate from a modified Jones’ model and extract discretionary accruals by making the 
difference between total accruals and normal ones. We chose the pooled regression method. 
Jones model is estimated by industry about 3 years accounts before the year preceding the 
operation (t-4 to t-2) of the absorbent 40 companies, which is pooled regression as was 
previously practiced by Djama and Boutant (2006) and Missonier-Piera and Ben-Amar 
(2007). This methodology allows to maximize the sample size which will be 120-years 
observations (40 firms for each of four years). Indeed, we have chosen this time for the 
collection of financial and accounting information of each of the companies that can not be 
operated beyond 4 years before the transaction, so the chronological regression method 
proved impossible. This is justifies our choice to perform a temporal regression by industry. 
At this stage, we have applied 120 years observations to estimate the parameters of the 
modified Jones model. These parameters are obtained by regressing the amount of total 
accruals for each firm i according to the variation in turnover, the amount of fixed assets and 
the amount of treasuries flows for the period t (t-4 to t-2) before the merger. The model is 
then: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
 𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
Δ𝑅𝐸𝑉
  𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛼2
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡
  𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛼3
𝐶𝐹
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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It is noted that we have standardized all the variables of the model by the total assets in the 
year preceding the operation to reduce heteroscedasticity problems. 
Table 2 presents Regression Parameter Estimation of sectoral model "distribution" according 
to the method of ordinary least square for the test sample (t-2 to t-4). 
 Coefficients t of Student statistic significativity 
Constant -0.057 -4.595 0.000*** 
𝚫𝑹𝑬𝑽
  𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏
 
-0.369 -2.737 0.01*** 
𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒕
  𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏
 
-0.031 -0.722 0.048** 
𝑪𝑭
𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏
 
0.237 1.978 0.067* 
***, **, * represents significance at the 1/ 5/10% level. 
Then we will calculate t-1 in normal Accruals for each company in this sector while applying 
the parameters previously estimated. The following equation allows us to deduct the amount 
of non-discretionary accruals: 
NDAit−1
Ait−2
= −0.057 ×
1
Ait−2
− 0.369 ×
∆REVit−1 − ∆CDit−1
Ait−2
− 0.031 ×
PPEit−1
Ait−2
+ 0,237 ×
CFit−1
Ait−2
 
Arriving at the final stage of our previously mentioned approach, the amount of total accruals 
in t-1 and for each sample company is calculated as: 
  𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−2
=
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−2
− (−0.057 ×
1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−2
− 0.369 ×
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡−1−∆𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−2
− 0.031 ×
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−2
+ 0,237 ×
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−2
)   
By doing this for each sector, discretionary accruals obtained for the absorbent 40 enterprises 
in t-1 is on average 3.17% of total assets in the previous year. So like Erickson and Wang 
(1999) and Asano et al. (2007), these results show the higher earnings management between 2 
and 10%. Hypothesis 1 is confirmed. 
4.2. Empirical result of hypothesis related to mergers and acquisitions context and 
those linked to shareholders’ perception. 
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To test the validity hypothesis identified in the literature we started at the Lower Square 
Ordinary method.  
The ordinary least squares aims to present the results of multiple regression model and 
specifically to confirm or refute the hypotheses identified by the literature. It must be ensured 
before the presentation and interpretation of the results according to OLS regression method, 
that there is no problem of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation of residuals problem and 
there is also an absence of multicolinearity. 
The multicollinearity is a computational difficulty that appears when two or more independent 
variables are highly correlated. From table 3, we present the output from the Pearson's 
correlation. The result of this table indicates the absence of multicollinearity the fact that the 
explanatory variables (operation size, dilution effects, multi-criteria approach, executive 
compensation, board independence and firm size) are weakly correlated with each other. 
Table 3 Pearson correlation 
 OpeS Dilu OperNatu Multi  ExeCompen Lever ShareStru BoardIndep AuditS Size 
OpeS 1 0.040 
0.7 
0.133 
0.193 
-0.082 
0.41 
-0.114 
0.265 
-0.075 
0.475 
-0.061 
0.55 
-0.075 
0.478 
0.0255 
0.81 
0.103 
0.32 
Dilu  1 0.032 
0.77 
-0.045 
0.654 
0.014 
0.89 
0.037 
0.72 
-0.0025 
0.985 
-0.011 
0.91 
0.350 
0.000*** 
0.071 
0.48 
OperNatu   1 0.043 
0.64 
-0.046 
 0.66 
0.329 
0.001*** 
-0.076 
0.45 
0.314 
0.002*** 
0.190 
0.06* 
0.203 
0.044** 
Multi    1 -0.2 
0.046 
0.074 
0.52 
0.155 
0.13 
-0.062 
0.54 
-0.075 
0.48 
-0.041 
0.68 
ExeCompe
n 
    1 0.204 
0.047 
0.117 
0.243 
0.176 
0.077 
0.003 
0.98 
-0.178 
0.08 
Lever      1 -0.069 
0.503 
-0.117 
0.27 
-0.062 
0,544 
 
0.045 
0,65 
 ShareStru       1 -0.184 
0.079* 
0.225 
0.04** 
-0.243 
0.045** 
BoardInde
p 
       1 0.030 
0 ,768 
 
0.124 
0,223 
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AuditS         1 0.489  
0.000*** 
Size          1 
OpeS : operation size ; Dilu : dilution effects; OperNatu: operation nature; Multi: multi-criteria approach; 
ExeCompen: executive compensation; Lever: leverage; ShareStru: shareholder structure; BoardIndep: board 
independence; AuditS: audit size; Size: size firm. 
***, **, * pearson correlation represents significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
Indeed, in order to check homoscedasticity of residues we have use White test. This test 
shows a Fisher value equal to 1,007 and the risk of rejection of the null hypothesis of no 
heteroscedasticity is quite high (p = 0.46> 0.05). This leads us to accept this hypothesis and to 
confirm that there is no problem of heteroscedasticity. Moreover, to ensure that there is no 
problem of correlation between residues we refer to the Durbin-Watson test. The value was 
very close to 2 (2.01). This proves that there is no problem of correlation between residues. 
The results are shown in the following table. 
Table 4 Estimation of explanatory model of discretionary accruals by Ordinary Least Square  
Variables expected sign Coefficient t Student Significativity 
Constante  0,069 3,663451 0,0010 
OpeS + -0,0014 -0,178160 0,8598 
Dilu  + 0,00057 0.09 0,928 
OperNatu - -0,004 -2,489 0,006*** 
Multi  + 0,009 1,886 0,10* 
ExeCompen + -0,026 -1,025 0,31 
Lever  + -0,003 -1,972 0.1* 
ShareStru +  -0,013  -1,794 0.083* 
BoardIndep - -0,09 -2,45 0,065* 
AudS - -0,5 -2,46 0,006*** 
Size  + -0,002 -1,357 0,185 
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***, * represents significance at the 1% and 10% level. 
The variable "nature of the operation" appeared with a negative coefficient consistent with the 
expected sign and equal to -0.004. The value of Student above -2, is equal to -2.489. It also 
appears that this variable is significant at the 10% threshold. This result is consistent with the 
hypothesis 8 of our study that the acquiring companies during restructuring adopt accounting 
and financial manipulations during takeovers; this is consistent with the study of Asano et al 
(2007). 
We also noted that "the accounting standards" come out with a positive and significant impact 
on results management (according to the hypothesis 9). That is to say, the use of accounting 
criteria facilitates the adoption of accounting and financial choice increasing the level of 
benefits of absorbent given their direct impact on parity. This result is justified by the fact 
that, according to the market efficiency hypothesis, the evaluation criteria that is indirectly 
based on the accounting statements as stock prices should not be affected by any earnings 
management. 
Moreover, we find that the variable "shareholder structure" presents a coefficient opposite to 
the predicted sense but significant at the 10% threshold, as the value of Student is relatively 
close to -2 (t = -1.794). Therefore, the concentrated ownership structure is a constraint results 
management executives of acquiring companies, the H3 hypothesis is disproved. This is 
consistent with the classic hypothesis raised by Smith (1976) in the general case but not 
specifically to the context of the operation. Indeed, he explained this by the reason that the 
dominant presence shareholding allows to exercise stricter control over the leaders and 
therefore result management will be reduced. 
However, regarding the variable "independent director", its coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant at the 10% threshold with a value of Student exceeding 2 (t = -2.45> 
2). We can assume that the higher the proportion of independent directors, the less limited the 
adoption of accounting and financial leadership selection. This result supports the hypothesis 
4, thereby strengthening the majority of research works namely done by Dechow et al (1996) 
,Jeanjean (2002), and Piot & Janin (2005), in this same context, the direction Button report 
called the introduction of this type of administrator in the council to improve quality control 
boards and oversight. 
Arriving at the variable "Audit size", it appears with a coefficient consistent with the expected 
direction (-0.5) and statistically significant at the 1%. We can confirm the hypothesis 5. 
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According to which membership of at least one auditor in a large audit firm has a negative 
effect on the level of earnings management. This finding is consistent with the research done 
by Sundgren (2003) in the context of public offerings. Indeed, constituting one of the external 
auditors controls, this variable is considered one of the governance mechanisms that influence 
the intensity of earnings management. 
Regarding the variable "dilution", the resulting coefficient is positive and consistent with the 
predicted direction (0.00057) but it is not significant at the 10% level (p = 0.928), as the value 
is less Student 2 (t = 0.09). This proves that when substantial dilutive effects are expected 
before the operation, no earnings management is detected. So we do not succeed at this stage 
to reach the conclusions of Erickson and Wang (1999). 
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5.  Conclusion 
 
The present work has made an attempt to study the earnings management of acquiring 
companies in the context of French mergers. The interest in this subject emerged out of 
Young's observation (2008) that the specific reasons prompting and forcing the leaders to 
handle their accounts before mergers & acquisitions operation today remain understudied and 
blurred. 
The goal was here in particular to detect possible earnings management of acquiring 
companies the year before the merger and the impact of shareholders ‘perception and also the 
motivation linked to merger and acquisition context. 
However, some limits are allocated to our paper. The first is the simplifier character of our 
hypotheses because they can not grasp the complexity of the behavior of the leaders. Indeed, 
they describe the influence of incentives or constraints on the management of linear results 
without including the possible interactions between the explanatory determinants of earnings 
management. 
Another limitation is related to the measurement of earnings management. Indeed, among the 
existing estimation models to calculate the abnormal part of the accounting and financial 
leadership selection, we chose one of the best known and most adopted to the viewpoints of 
previous research and also because of the possibilities available in the accounting data in our 
study sample. To overcome this limit to a certain extent, we conducted additional analyzes by 
analyzing directly handled several accounting items. 
As a future research, we propose to extend this work to other institutional contexts in which 
the pressures of the social stakeholders and legislators are strong. 
We can also suggest a comparative study between the context of one of emerging countries 
and French context which has never, to our knowledge, been investigated in previous 
research. 
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